

Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: SALT A-408

U.S. SALT DELEGATION REQUESTS FOLLOWING TEXT OF A-408
MEMCON, BETWEEN AMBASSADOR JOHNSON AND MINISTER SEMENOV,
OF OCT. 19, 1973, BE REPEATED TO MOSCOW AND USNATO.

DISCUSSION:

1. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON OFFICIALLY INTRODUCED MR. RALPH
EARLE, THE NEW MEMBER OF THE US DELEGATION, WHO HAD
REPLACED MR. GRAYBEAL. HE ALSO INTRODUCED DR. BROWN, WHO
WAS WELL KNOWN TO MOST OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION, AND HAD
JUST REJOINED THE US DELEGATION IN GENEVA.

2. MINISTER SEMENOV, ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION,
EXPRESSED DEEP SATISFACTION THAT MR. EARLE AND DR. BROWN
WOULD BE TAKING PART IN OUR JOINT VENTURE, WHICH HE
BELIEVED WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE.

HE THEN READ A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE QUALITATIVE
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LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS (ATTACHMENT).

3. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON THANKED MINISTER SEMENOV, AND SAID
HE WAS GLAD THAT MINISTER SEMENOV HAD ADDRESSED WHAT WAS,

OF COURSE, ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE AGREEMENT WE WERE DISCUSSING. HE SAID MINISTER SEMENOV HAD CORRECTLY POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR POINTS OF VIEW CONCERNING HOW TO APPROACH THIS QUESTION. HE SAID THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD BE TRANSMITTED TO WASHINGTON, THAT IT WOULD BE GIVEN CAREFUL STUDY, AND THAT HE WOULD EXPECT TO BE COMMENTING ON IT IN DUE COURSE.

4. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON SAID HE HAD NO FORMAL STATEMENT TO MAKE TODAY, AND ASKED WHETHER MINISTER SEMENOV OR ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAD ANY OTHER MATTERS TO RAISE TODAY.

5. MINISTER SEMENOV SAID THAT THEY DID NOT.

6. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON SAID IN THAT CASE HE WOULD SUGGEST SETTLING ON THE DATE FOR THE NEXT MEETING, AND PROPOSED THAT IT TAKE PLACE ON TUESDAY, OCTOBER 23, 1973 AT 11:00 A.M. AT THE SOVIET MISSION.

7. MINISTER SEMENOV AGREED.

8. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON ADJOURNED THE MEETING.

9. ATTACHMENT: MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT

SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 19, 1973

10. TODAY WE WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS SOME QUESTIONS RELATING TO QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

11. AS YOU KNOW, THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS PROVIDE THAT IN WORKING OUT THE PROVISIONS OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT "THE LIMITATIONS PLACED ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS CAN APPLY BOTH TO THEIR QUANTITATIVE ASPECTS AS WELL AS TO THEIR QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT."

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INCLUSION OF THIS PROVISION IN THE DOCUMENT SIGNED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL INDICATES THAT THE SIDES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE ROLE THAT QUESTIONS OF LIMITING QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT CAN PLAY IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS A WHOLE. ACHIEVEMENT OF POSITIVE RESULTS IN THIS AREA, TOO, WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS--TO WORK OUT FURTHER MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND THEREBY TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR AND STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

12. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY DECLARED THAT IT IS

READY IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT TO DISCUSS THE QUESTIONS OF

PLACING LIMITS ON THE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF APRIL 6, 1973 EMPHASIZED THAT IN WORKING OUT AN UNDERSTANDING ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IT IS NECESSARY AMONG OTHER THINGS TO FIND WAYS OF ESTABLISHING LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENT OF SUCH WEAPONS.

13. ONE OF THE MAJOR AREAS OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS TODAY, IS THE LIMITATION OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES (MRV/MIRVS). AS EVIDENT FROM THEIR STATEMENTS, THE SIDES ARE READY TO CONSIDER THIS QUESTION, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH TO ITS RESOLUTION.

14. I WOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT AS EARLY AS AT THE INITIAL STAGE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS THE SOVIET SIDE RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE NEED TO CONSIDER AND SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES OF ALL TYPES. IN 1970, IN VIENNA AND HELSINKI, THE USSR DELEGATION EMPHASIZED THAT THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM OF CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE DESERVES SERIOUS ATTENTION AT THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS.

15. THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES IT IMPORTANT THAT AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DURING WHICH THE SIDES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS,
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DECIDED TO CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS ON WORKING OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE QUESTION OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES ALSO BE CONSIDERED. OF COURSE, ANY POSSIBLE MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF MRV/MIRVS MUST CORRESPOND TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS, AND MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS A WHOLE. THEY CAN MAKE A GENUINE CONTRIBUTION TO ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVE SET FOR US IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, AND CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY.

16. THE SOVIET SIDE HAS CAREFULLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY EXAMINED THE PROPOSAL OF THE U.S. SIDE OF MAY 11, 1973 ON FREEZING MRV/MIRVS FOR ICBMS. ANALYSIS OF THIS PROPOSAL HAS SHOWN THAT IT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE TASKS AND PRINCIPLES MENTIONED ABOVE.

17. SPEAKING ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE, FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, OF

ACHIEVING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS, THE USSR DELEGATION HAS REPEATEDLY DRAWN THE ATTENTION OF THE U.S. SIDE TO THE ACCELERATED EQUIPPING OF MINUTEMAN MISSILES WITH MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES AND THE REARMING OF SUBMARINES BY POSEIDON BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH MRV/MIRVS, WHICH CONTINUE IN THE U.S.

18. IN THIS CONNECTION ONE CANNOT BUT OBSERVE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME, IN SPITE OF THE ADOPTED LIMITATIONS ON ABM SYSTEMS AND THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, THE PROBLEM OF DEPLOYING MRV/MIRVS ON ICBMS AND SLBMS CONTINUES AT AN ACCELERATED PACE IN THE U.S. THE INCONSISTENCY OF THESE PROGRAMS WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS, IN POINT OF FACT, IS ALSO RECOGNIZED EVEN IN THE U.S., WHERE IN HIGHLY PLACED OFFICIAL BODIES THE VIEW WAS EXPRESSED THAT THE EFFORTS OF THE U.S. IN THE FIELD OF MULTIPLE WARHEADS CAN HAVE A DESTABILIZING INFLUENCE UPON
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THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. THIS VIEW IS BASED ON THE ASSESSMENT THAT THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN THE U.S. IS SHARPLY INCREASING, AND, WHAT IS MORE, AS A RESULT OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES OF SLBMS, WITH RESPECT TO WHICH THE U.S. SIDE DOES NOT EVEN PROPOSE ANY LIMITATIONS.

19. IS IT NOT OBVIOUS THAT PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD MAKE SUCH A DEVELOPMENT OF THE COURSE OF EVENTS POSSIBLE, DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THE TASK OF WORKING OUT EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THEIR IMPLEMENTATION WOULD IN NO WAY CONTRIBUTE TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF STRATEGIC STABILITY.

20. THE USSR DELEGATION HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO DECLARE THAT THE US PROPOSAL ON "FREEZING" MRV/MIRVS FOR ICBMS CANNOT BE ACCEPTED SINCE IT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.

21. AN OBJECTIVE, REALISTIC APPROACH REQUIRES THAT RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTIONS OF QUALITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS BE IN ACCORD WITH THE TASK AND THE AGREED PRINCIPLES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

22. GUIDED BY THE DESIRE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF LIMITING MRV/MIRVS, THE SOVIET SIDE HAS INCLUDED APPROPRIATE PROVISIONS IN THE DRAFT PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF

OCTOBER 9, 1973. ARTICLE VIII OF THE DRAFT STATES: "THE

PARTIES UNDERTAKE TO LIMIT THE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES (MRV/MIRVS) OF ANY TYPE ON ICBMS AND SLBMS. THE NUMBER OF ICBMS AND SLBMS EQUIPPED WITH MULTIPLE RE-ENTRY VEHICLES SHALL NOT EXCEED FOR EACH PARTY THE AGREED PORTION OF THE TOTAL NUMBERS OF THESE MISSILES SPECIFIED IN ARTICLES III AND IV OF THIS AGREEMENT."

23. THE CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES OF ANY TYPE ON ICBMS AND SLBMS IS THE RESULT OF THOROUGH
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STUDIES CONDUCTED ON THE BASIS OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN ALL ITS TOTALITY AND DYNAMICS. IT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS HELD EARLIER. ITS IMPLEMENTATION WOULD LIMIT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MRV/MIRVS OF BOTH SIDES IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY AND INADMISSIBILITY OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, WHICH HAS BEEN CONFIRMED IN THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS.

24. THE SOVIET SIDE IS CONVINCED THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE VIII OF THE SOVIET DRAFT ARE A REALISTIC AND REASONABLE BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE QUESTION OF LIMITING MRV/MIRVS IN CONFORMITY WITH THE AFOREMENTIONED PRINCIPLE.

25. IT IS PRECISELY ALONG THIS PATH THAT THE SIDES COULD ACHIEVE MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE POSITIVE RESULTS. THE USSR DELEGATION IS READY TO MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE CONTRIBUTION TO THE SEARCH FOR SUCH SOLUTIONS.

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